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RAZIL, a country roughly the size of the continental United
States, contains approximately 60 percent of the Amazon Basin,
the largest rainforest area in the world,1 and is home to a full one-
third of all the tropical rainforest area in the world.2 The Amazon region
covers 58 percent of Brazil's entire territory. 3 The region has been re-
ferred to as a "cauldron of biodiversity," since it is estimated to contain
between 800,000 and five million species - 15 to 30 percent of all the
species in the world.4
Despite assurances by the Brazilian government to the contrary, a re-
cent study by Smithsonian researchers concluded that deforestation in the
Amazon has not seen a significant decline from the "catastrophic" rates
of the 1970s and 1980s. 5 The study found that the average rate of defor-
estation from 1988 to 1998 was almost 7,000 square miles per year, com-
pared to an average rate of more than 8,000 square miles per year from
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Outlook, NewsFactor Network, Jan. 29, 2002, available at http://sci.newsfactor.com/
perl/story/16038.html. Although Brazilian authorities disputed the researchers'
findings, the researchers could find virtually no evidence supporting the claims of
much smaller amounts of deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon. "We used a rig-
orous statistical analysis to see if Amazonian deforestation had dropped in the
1990s, relative to the 1970s and 1980s," said William Laurance of the Smithsonian
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1978 to 1988.6 Most disturbingly, though, the study noted an upward
trend throughout most of the 1990s, including a staggering 11,000 square
miles in 1995 - an area larger than Maryland. 7
This comment will detail the many causes of deforestation in the Bra-
zilian Amazon, from the policies of the Brazilian government itself to the
many industries that have been facilitated either directly by the govern-
ment or by private economic incentives. The effects of deforestation on
the people of Brazil and of the world in general will also be examined.
Next, the many efforts undertaken to deal with the deforestation of the
Brazilian Amazon, from international initiatives to those of Brazil itself,
will be analyzed. Finally, this comment will discuss measures the United
States and the rest of the world can take to significantly curtail
deforestation.
A. CAUSES OF DEFORESTATION IN THE BRAZILIAN AMAZON
Before examining the various industries and policies affecting the Bra-
zilian Amazon, it is necessary to understand the dreadful economic situa-
tion that has set the stage for rampant deforestation. Throughout the
1960s and the early 1970s, Brazil experienced rapid economic growth due
in large part to an ability to efficiently and at least somewhat responsibly
use the vast resources located in its territory. 8 Brazil's rapidly growing
economy, however, made the country increasingly reliant on foreign
sources of energy; by the world oil crisis of 1973 Brazil had become the
largest oil importer in the world among the developing nations.9 Faced
with drastically scaling back its suddenly bountiful economy, Brazil in-
stead opted to significantly increase foreign borrowing in the hope that
any debt incurred at the time would be easily overcome as oil prices re-
turned to normal and Brazil's economy resumed its upswing.10 Brazil's
strategy was seemingly successful through much of the remainder of the
decade, but in 1979, when the world experienced yet another oil crisis,
Brazil was confronted with a dire scenario: not only was it still hugely
dependent on foreign energy, but now a near-worldwide recession had
greatly diminished the market for Brazil's exports, and skyrocketing in-
terest rates had rendered the country's debt all but unmanageable.'1 The
stage was now set for an unprecedented assault on Brazil's primary asset:
the Amazon rainforest.
Because of Brazil's determination to do whatever necessary to pay off
its debt, many of the various industries discussed below have developed
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See Reisman, supra note 1, at 402.
9. Id.
10. See id.
11. Id. at 402-03. By the end of 1982, Brazil's debt totaled more than $85.3 billion,
prompting a five-year period in which foreign creditors restricted new lending. Id.
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directly as a result of this financial near-sightedness.12 Government-sanc-
tioned policies thus could be considered the root cause of the rampant
deforestation of the Brazilian Amazon, with virtually all policies being
the product of quickly reached poorly reasoned decisions to find a quick
fix for Brazil's increasingly dire economic condition.1 3
There are a handful of industries that have contributed directly to the
deforestation of the Brazilian Amazon, but one main theme unites them
all: The Brazilian government considers the rainforest to be a public good
that can only be made a marketable good once it is cleared.1 4 Little ef-
fort has been made to give the Brazilian Amazon, in its natural form, any
kind of value; rather, the widely accepted notion seems to be that the
only way the rainforest can be valuable is if it is cleared.15 This notion
has paved the way for the rampant deforestation of the Brazilian Ama-
zon, most of which is undertaken by the industries (and, in some cases,
government policies) discussed below.
1. Cattle Ranching
Clearing massive areas of the Brazilian Amazon for cattle ranching has
wreaked large-scale damage not just on the rainforest but on the societies
within it, as well - which, as discussed below, paves the way for a vicious
cycle leading to more and more deforestation. It is estimated that be-
tween 1966 and 1983 cattle ranching accounted for two-thirds of all the
deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon. 16 The clearing of large swaths of
land to create pastures began not so much as a response to the needs of
the Brazilian people but rather to the large demand for low-cost beef in
post-World War II Europe and the United States.17 The Western world's
seemingly unrelenting demand for cheap beef encouraged many Latin
American countries, such as Brazil, to clear huge areas of rainforest for
pastures.' 8 The support offered by Europe and the United States was not
just moral; between 1971 and 1977, for example, over $3.5 billion in loans
was provided to various Latin American countries to facilitate the mas-
sive land conversion. 19
12. See Diana J. Eitman, Maintaining Sovereignty and the Tropical Rainforests: The
Promise of Debt-For-Nature Swaps, 24-SPG ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 29, 33-
34 (2001).
13. See id.
14. See Emilio F. Moran, The Law, Politics, and Economics of Amazonian Deforesta-
tion, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 397, 398 (1994).
15. See id.
16. Matthew B. Royer, Note, Halting Neotropical Deforestation: Do the Forest Princi-
ples Have What it Takes?, 6 DUKE ENvTL. L. & POL'Y F. 105, 112 (1996).
17. Jacqueline Klosek, Note, The Destruction of the Brazilian Amazon: An Interna-
tional Problem, 6 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 119, 122-23 (1998).
18. See id.
19. Id. at 123. Various Latin American countries, including Brazil, received assistance
mainly from the World Bank and the Inter-Latin American Development Bank,
prompting them to convert millions of acres of tropical rainforest and cropland to
pastures. Id.
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Financial aid from much of the developed world made the Brazilian
government encourage cattle ranching vigorously. The government de-
veloped a subsidy program that allowed ranchers to secure interest-free
loans, and ranchers were also allowed to obtain the necessary land and
equipment at dramatically reduced prices in return for a promise to use
the land for cattle ranching. 20 The Brazilian government also did nothing
to discourage the prevailing cultural attitude that considered a rancher
lazy if he gave his land too much time to regenerate. Instead, ranchers
were encouraged to clear more and more land and were even further
encouraged by the generous economic incentives. 2 1
The fact that the use of land for cattle ranching is decidedly inefficient
only compounds the problem. Cattle ranching in the Brazilian Amazon
usually occurs on lands of low productivity and often results in the aban-
donment of these lands after a relatively short time - sometimes as little
as four years.22 It is estimated that in order to make $1 million a year
from raising cattle in the Brazilian Amazon, about thirty-eight square
miles of forest have to be cleared; mining and timber uses, on the other
hand, require clearing less than one square mile to make the equivalent
return.23 Some estimate that an undisturbed area of forest has the poten-
tial to produce ten times more food (including fruit, game, and fish) than
would be produced were the same area converted into land for cattle.2 4
Although studies have shown that these transformed lands - if not too
damaged - do recover a fair amount of forest structure, in many cases the
new growth is significantly less dense and diverse. 25
Cattle ranching in Brazil has also had immeasurable effects in the
country's social arena, and, consequently, has affected the social structure
so crucial to maintaining the preservation of the Brazilian Amazon.
Clashes between cattle ranchers and traditional rubber tappers, whose
occupation requires them to do virtually no large-scale damage to the
rainforest, have often degenerated into violence that has untold effects on
the traditional social fabric of the region.2 6 In one of the most highly
publicized occurrences, Brazilian cattle rancher Darli Alves de Silva and
his son, Darci murdered rubber tapper Chico Mendes in the late 1980s.
The father and son were sentenced to nineteen years in prison. 27 The
murder of one man in a region fraught with violence is itself relatively
insignificant; but the incident is indicative of how one destructive industry
can destabilize not only the actual rainforest, but also the societies within
it. This indicates a disturbing cycle at work, as well. An industry contrib-
utes to the deforestation of a region and in the process destabilizes the
20. Eitman, supra note 12, at 33.
21. See id.
22. Royer, supra note 16.
23. Klosek, supra note 17, at 123-24.
24. Janelle E. Kellman, The Brazilian Legal Tradition and Environmental Protection:
Friend or Foe, 25 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 145, 149 (2002).
25. Royer, supra note 16.
26. See Klosek, supra note 17, at 123.
27. Id.
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social structure within, leaving traditional people to often abandon previ-
ous lifestyles and paving the way for more deforestation since the tradi-
tional guardians of the forest are now either gone or hopelessly
distracted.
Considering how devastating the cattle ranching industry as been to the
conservation of the Brazilian Amazon, the economic payoff has been
woefully lacking. Even though huge areas of rainforest have been con-
verted into cattle pastures, the price of beef in Brazil has declined mini-
mally; any economic benefit derived from this practice has been from
continued sales of land, which each time is more deforested than
before. 28 The one thing that could potentially curtail this problem - a 25
percent capital gains tax on land sales - is rarely collected, giving those
engaging in the sales little incentive to stop.29 Instead, the conversion of
large areas of the Brazilian Amazon into cattle pasture will likely con-
tinue as long as the activity continues to appear to be viewed as offering
an unusually high return in an economy with consistently high levels of
inflation. 30
2. Pharmaceutical Companies
The pharmaceutical industry, at least superficially, appears to be one of
the parties with the most interest in reversing the devastating deforesta-
tion of the Brazilian Amazon. It is, after all, the biodiversity of the region
in which the pharmaceutical industry arguably has the biggest stake. Bi-
odiversity, which the United Nations has defined as "the variability
among living organisms from all sources including, inter alia, terrestrial,
marine and other aquatic ecosystems and the ecological complexes of
which they are part," 3' is a crucial factor for pharmaceutical companies
because most of the medicines today are at least partly derived from
plants and animals.32 It is estimated that in the United States, 25 percent
of prescription drugs derive from plant extracts, 13 percent from microor-
ganisms, and 3 percent from animals. 33 In fact, these compounds were
involved in developing the twenty most popular drugs in the United
States, the combined sales of which were calculated as being slightly
under $6 billion in 1988.34
Ironically, the pharmaceutical industry is often accused of taking part
in the same large-scale destruction of the rainforest as other industries.
Not surprisingly, once a company finds a desirable species, it may take
28. Moran, supra note 14, at 399.
29. Id.
30. See id. at 398.
31. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Convention on
Biological Diversity June 15, 2002, available at http://www.un.org/documents/eco
soc/cnl7/1995/ecnl7l995-7.htm.
32. Ryan K. McKain, Note, A Critical Evaluation of the Development and Implementa-
tion of Forest Preservation Strategies, 15 CONN. J. INT'L L. 235, 243 (2000).
33. Erin B. Newman, Earth's Vanishing Medicine Cabinet: Rain Forest Destruction and
Its Impact on the Pharmaceutical Industry, 20 AM. J.L. & MED. 479, 480 (1994).
34. Id.
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part in large-scale extraction of that species if it is convinced that it may
have come upon the next highly successful medicine. 35 A much more
common scenario, though (since these companies are often unable - or
unwilling - to commit the funds necessary to take part directly in large-
scale extraction), is the development of a potential medicine through the
use - and often at the expense - of indigenous people.36 This makes
sense from the companies' standpoint because it is often these indigenous
people who first discovered the healing power that a particular plant or
insect possesses.37
The problem, however, is that once a pharmaceutical company acquires
the rights to harvest a particular species, the indigenous people who
helped the company in the first place often are left behind at the expense
of their land. 38 Faced with a dramatic altering of their lifestyles, these
people are frequently forced to move elsewhere, leaving the caretaking of
the land - a hugely important factor in the prevention of deforestation -
to someone else or no one at all. Either way the situation frequently
spells doom for the particular area of rainforest affected. 39 This scenario
is a prime example of how an industry can dramatically affect the Brazil-
ian Amazon in an indirect, but just as damaging, fashion.
In a development promising to both the Brazilian Amazon and those
who benefit from the discovery of new drugs, pharmaceutical companies
had scaled back their often-damaging research in favor of more modern
techniques by 1980.40 Computer-modeling techniques allowed research-
ers to derive synthetic drugs in the laboratory instead of actually going
into the rainforest and participating in large-scale extraction. 41 The rea-
son for this was more a concern for the company's bottom line than for
the environment: Only one plant or animal sample in 10,000 leads to a
useful medication, and, more importantly, pure products of nature are
non-patentable - allowing many companies to profit from the high-priced
and time-consuming work of just one.42
By the early 1990s, however, pharmaceutical companies had begun to
gravitate once again to traditional plant and animal research in the Bra-
zilian Amazon. 43 This trend is partly because of the realization that many
of the most powerful, and thus most effective, compounds are decidedly
difficult to replicate in labs. More importantly, however, advances in
prospecting techniques have allowed research in the rainforest to become
less time consuming and more cost effective. 4 One bright spot among
this return to the rainforest, though, is that the companies involved have





40. See Newman, supra note 33, at 482-83.
41. Id. at 482.
42. See id. at 483.
43. Id.
44. See id. at 483-84.
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realized that maintaining the biodiversity of the Brazilian Amazon is in-
creasingly crucial to them, since many drugs become less and less effec-
tive over time due to increased resistance. 45 It remains to be seen
whether this newfound realization on the part of pharmaceutical compa-
nies will actually translate into a more conscientious attitude toward the
preservation of the rainforest or whether the companies' high-minded
talk of environmentalism is merely a response to the many critics who are
well aware of the companies' renewed love affair with the Brazilian
Amazon.
3. Development Schemes
A significant amount of the deforestation of the Brazilian Amazon has
not necessarily occurred because of any natural resources possessed by
the land but rather because of the most basic characteristic of the land
itself - the fact that it is land (something, according to the Brazilian gov-
ernment, that should be developed). In 1966, Brazil instituted Operation
Amazonia, a project designed to convert the Brazilian Amazon into com-
mercially productive land.46 By providing tax incentives to companies
willing to develop this area, the Brazilian government facilitated the arri-
val of huge multinational corporations that immediately took to clearing
large portions of rainforest to make room for their operations. 47 More
than 6,000 miles of roads were built through previously untouched areas
of the rainforest to further induce the movement into Brazil by these
corporations. 48
Commercial development schemes such as Operation Amazonia have
had a hugely deleterious effect on the sustainability of the Brazilian Ama-
zon. Between 1966 (the start of Operation Amazonia) and 1983, approxi-
mately 40,000 square miles of rainforest were cleared for commercial
development.49 Of all the rainforest destroyed during this period, the
Brazilian government estimates that 38 percent of the deforestation is di-
rectly attributable to large-scale corporate development. 50
Large-scale multinational corporations were not the only beneficiaries
of Brazil's decision to exploit as much of its land as possible. With help
from the World Bank, the Brazilian government started large-scale colo-
nization projects designed to fill in some of the less densely populated
areas of the country, such as the state of Rondonia in the northwest. 5'
These programs were so attractive that by early 1984, 80,000 families had
settled into the area, with each receiving generous parcels of land but
45. See id. at 484.
46. Klosek, supra note 17, at 126.
47. Id. at 126-27.
48. Roger W. Findley, Legal and Economic Incentives for the Sustainable Use of
Rainforests, 32 TEX. INT'L L.J. 17 (1997).
49. Klosek, supra note 17, at 127.
50. Id. at 127-28.
51. Findley, supra note 48.
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little or no guidance on how to properly use and sustain it.52
Unfortunately for both Brazil and the Brazilian Amazon, these devel-
opmental schemes have accomplished virtually none of their initial goals.
With regard to Brazil's plans to have huge multinational corporations de-
velop the land and, in the process, Brazil's economy, the project has been
an utter failure. 53 The corporations who moved in created minimal em-
ployment opportunities and demonstrated no interest in putting their
profits into anything but their own bank accounts.54 Brazil has been left
with little more to show for this than thousands upon thousands of square
miles of useless ex-rainforest land and a still-huge national debt.
As for the colonization programs, Brazil failed in its stated goal of pro-
viding agricultural credits only for the use of land that would permit sus-
tainable use.55 Instead, the failure of the Brazilian government to
provide these agricultural credits, combined with the unexpected arrival
of hundreds of thousands of settlers, resulted in a huge amount of people
settling on less fertile land, where they would simply exploit the land for
all possible uses and then move on to other areas of the rainforest. 56 In-
deed, it seems the only thing Brazil managed to "sustain" with this ambi-
tious yet poorly conceived project was the continued deforestation of the
Brazilian Amazon.
4. Energy Needs
As various industries and other commercial interests have become in-
creasingly prevalent in the Brazilian Amazon, the need for energy has
also proliferated. The construction of massive hydroelectric dams, while
providing much-needed help in this area, has contributed significantly to
the destruction of the rainforests. 57 The construction of a large dam can
wreak havoc on the areas of rainforest around it, often flooding
thousands of acres of land and displacing indigenous peoples. 58 Although
the construction of a large dam in Tucurui was successful in that it pro-
vided a huge new source of energy in the area, it also created a reservoir
covering over 1,000 square kilometers. 59 The sudden flooding of an area
this large, despite efforts by developers to minimize the effects, caused
significant damage to the area.60
Ironically, it is hydroelectric power's general reputation as an environ-
mentally friendly source of energy that played a big role in the construc-
52. See id. at 18. The lack of guidance provided by the Brazilian government as to the
proper means to achieve sustainable use was significant because virtually all of
these colonization projects were undertaken to achieve sustainable use of these
lands.
53. See Klosek, supra note 17, at 128.
54. See id.
55. See Findley, supra note 48, at 18.
56. See id.





tion of dams in the Brazilian Amazon. 61 Only recently have Brazilian
officials realized that any pollution kept from the air probably does not
balance out the large tracts of rainforest that are disrupted or destroyed
by dams. As such, the trend in Brazil has gravitated recently toward the
use of gas and nuclear power instead.62
This situation demonstrates a dilemma often encountered by Brazil:
Should efforts to save the Brazilian Amazon take precedence over all
other environmental considerations, or is it understandable (or maybe
even necessary) to sometimes knowingly sacrifice part of the rainforest
for the benefit of other parts of the environment? Complicating matters
is the interrelatedness of the different parts of the environment; an area
of rainforest might be saved from having a dam built nearby, but what if
the resulting increase in air pollution ends up, either directly or indirectly,
harming the rainforest even more?
5. Timber
It is somewhat ironic that the one industry in the Brazilian Amazon
that clears areas of forest for the actual trees - not just to make way for
something else - for the most part is not a big contributor to the overall
problem of deforestation in the region. When large areas of the Brazilian
Amazon were being cleared throughout the 1970s, for example, it is esti-
mated that only 4 percent of the deforestation taking place was caused by
the timber industry.6 3 Nevertheless, areas are that are completely defor-
ested can have significant negative impacts on the surrounding environ-
ment; runoff from lands that have been clear cut has been observed
clogging surrounding rivers and deltas, doing untold damage to the
marine populations in those places. 64
The timber industry also may be damaging the Brazilian Amazon in
ways that are not reflected in statistics. Clear-cut logging is not a pre-
ferred method by the industry in the region, but "selective" logging, as it
as known, may end up completely removing one species of tree from a
particular area of forest, which can have a devastating impact on the
ecosystem of that area.65 The difficulty of quantifying such damage
makes "selective" logging especially concerning.
The main reason why the timber industry has traditionally had such a
small effect on the Brazilian Amazon is that large-scale cutting and trans-
porting is considered financially prohibitive. 66 Additionally, few of the
many species of trees contained in the Brazilian Amazon are popular in
61. Id.
62. See id.
63. Klosek, supra note 17, at 125.
64. Phillip E. Wilson, Jr., Comment, Barking up the Right Tree: Proposals for Enhanc-
ing the Effectiveness of the International Tropical Timber Agreement, 10 TEMP.,
INT'L & COMP. L.J. 229, 243 (1996).
65. Eitman, supra note 12, at 31-32.
66. Klosek, supra note 17, at 125.
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either Brazilian or international markets.67 Because of these problems
with cost and quality, most timbering to date has been on a relatively
small scale and is not considered to have done significant damage to the
Brazilian Amazon.68
The timber industry is becoming more of a problem area, however, as
tradition takes a backseat to Brazil's bottom line. Like many of the in-
dustries contributing to deforestation of the Brazilian Amazon, the tim-
ber industry is increasingly influenced by foreign interests. 69 In the past
several years, the Brazilian government has taken to selling large
amounts of land to Asian logging companies; as of 1998, twenty-five such
companies owned at least 20,000 square kilometers in the Brazilian Ama-
zon.70 Although the Brazilian Environment Institute (BEI) requires
companies to submit a plan of sustainable exploitation before they pro-
ceed, staff and resource shortages at the BEI have prevented it from ef-
fectively evaluating each plan; meaning plans that should be rejected
often are approved.71 This inability to ensure each plan is proper, along
with the above-mentioned lack of restrictions against foreign timber com-
panies, has set the stage for the timber industry to become yet another
major contributor to the deforestation of the Brazilian Amazon.
6. Mining
Mining has developed into a potentially troublesome industry with re-
gard to the conservation of the Brazilian Amazon as much because of the
Brazilian government's slow response to it as because of the actual effects
it has on the environment. 72 This hesitance to deal with the mining indus-
try is indicative of the fact that mining (usually for gold and tin) tradition-
ally has been thought to have little harmful effect on the environment.73
But as Brazil has become the world's leading extractor of gold,74 poison-
ous mercury used in gold extraction has polluted both waters in the im-
mediate vicinity of the area being mined and waters downstream of the
mining site.75 It remains to be seen whether serious efforts will be made
to deal with an industry that has only recently begun to be viewed as yet
another problem area in the fight against the deforestation of the Brazil-
ian Amazon.
7. The Underlying Cause: Brazil's Ideology of Developmentalism
Regardless of what effects a specific industry or policy discussed above





71. See id. at 126.
72. See Eitman, supra note 12, at 32.
73. Klosek, supra note 17, at 124.
74. Eitman, supra note 12, at 32.
75. Klosek, supra note 17, at 124.
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the blame for this ongoing problem, at least indirectly, can be traced to
one source: Brazil's ideology of developmentalism. 76 Critics have argued
that this mindset has taken precedent over concerns about the environ-
ment, even though it is often the environment itself that has enabled Bra-
zil to turn such an ideology into reality.77 This irony, though, has not
been lost on the Brazilian government and international community.
Their attempts to deal with the problems leading to this situation and the
effectiveness of such attempts will be examined next.
B. ATrEMPTS TO HALT DEFORESTATION
In this section, only the most general attempts on the part of Brazil and
the international community to deal with deforestation in the Brazilian
Amazon will be examined. Although there have been more specific at-
tempts by both communities to address the problem, an analysis of the
broader provisions is sufficient to set out the basic problems that have
been inherent in both Brazilian and world responses to deforestation.
1. Brazilian Efforts
Rewritten in 1988, the Brazilian Constitution can at best be said to pay
superficial attention to the crisis facing the Brazilian Amazon. But coun-
tering the Constitution's words declaring Brazil's forests to be a "national
patrimony" 78 and allowing their use only under conditions that ensure
environmental preservation is a sobering reality: The Brazilian govern-
ment, like many governments - especially those in other Latin American
countries - was ill-equipped to effectively implement the vaguely worded
yet high-minded declarations in its constitution.79
The federal government in Brazil is limited by the constitution to for-
mulating only general policies, which are then passed on to the various
states and counties to be specified and implemented.8° Although the new
constitution of 1988 seemingly broke with tradition by obliging states and
counties to take part in various forms of environmental monitoring, the
reality is that few states or counties have implemented environmental
policies that are specific enough to be workable. 81 Even when a specific
policy has been implemented, such as an attempt in southern Brazil to
control the use of environmentally damaging fertilizers, fertilizer compa-
nies fought the policy and went so far as to challenge its
constitutionality. 82
Another problem with most of the power to effect environmental poli-
cies being given to various states and counties is Brazil's taxation system.
76. See Romano, supra note 2. at 70.
77. See id.
78. C.F. art. 4
79. See Kellman, supra note 24, at 152.
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Almost all of the state and municipal taxes collected are first funneled
through the federal government before a small proportion is returned to
the various localities, giving them little incentive to implement environ-
mentally friendly tax policies. 83 This situation, along with the above-
mentioned difficulty encountered with private entities when environmen-
tal legislation is actually implemented, demonstrates a basic problem with
effectively dealing with the deforestation of the Brazilian Amazon: The
entities charged with protecting the environment - the states and counties
- often have little incentive to do so. Even when they actually do imple-
ment an environmentally friendly policy, it is likely to be either chal-
lenged or ignored by the private sector.
2. International Efforts
a. Stockholm Conference
The Stockholm Conference on Humanity and the Environment
marked the beginning of the modern era of international environmental
law. 84 Held in 1972, the conference was the first international attempt to
reconcile the always-interrelated and often conflicting notions of devel-
opment and the environment. 85 The Stockholm Conference introduced a
widely recognized theme of international environmental law, one that
hits at the very core of the problem with Brazil and the deforestation of
its Amazon region: Although a country may have sovereign rights to the
development of its own land, it also has obligations toward both the envi-
ronment and other nations. 86
b. Earth Summit
Increasing international awareness - as well as a realization that little
had been done since Stockholm to transform many of the issues identified
into actual policies - laid the groundwork for significantly more substan-
tial anti-deforestation initiatives.87 The most significant of these is the
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UN-
CED).88 The Earth Summit, as it is more commonly known, met in Rio
de Janeiro in June 1992 and adopted five main documents: (1) the Con-
vention on Biological Diversity; (2) the Rio Declaration on Environment
and Development; (3) the Climate Convention; (4) the Statement of For-
est Principles; and (5) Agenda 21, which contains a blueprint for action
on all areas of activity relating to sustainable development. 89 Of these,
the Forest Principles have provided the most detailed and far-reaching
83. Id.
84. Wilson, Jr., supra note 64, at 236.
85, Id. at 235.
86. See id. at 236.
87. See Andronico 0. Adede, The Treaty System from Stockholm (1972) to Rio De
Janeiro (1992), 13 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 33, 37-38 (1995).
88. See Klosek, supra note 17, at 144.
89. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, June 3, 1992,
available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/confl5l/aconfl5l26-1 .htm.
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guidance in terms of specific measures that should be employed in the
effort to stop the deforestation of the Brazilian Amazon.90
(i) Forest Principles
Although not legally binding, the Forest Principles are significant in
that they represent a comprehensive attempt by a diverse group of na-
tions to establish rules applicable to all types of forests.91 The Forest
Principles are widely considered to represent the most far-reaching at-
tempt up to that time to deal with deforestation, addressing everything
from rather obvious environmental issues such as protection and restora-
tion to issues such as the rights of indigenous people, the participation of
local communities, and even finance and trade issues. 92 The wide-ranging
spectrum of issues addressed made the Forest Principles significant in
that, while not legally binding, it at least showed willingness on the inter-
national community's part to recognize the many problems either leading
to deforestation or being caused by it. Either way, it was important for
many of these less obvious problems and situations to be acknowledged
by a respected international body. 93
The Forest Principles, while intended to apply to all forests globally,
contain certain principles particularly relevant and applicable to the prob-
lem of deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon. Some of these appear di-
rected toward government schemes like Brazil's that helped set the stage
for large-scale deforestation, proclaiming that policies (including fiscal,
trade and industrial) that lead to forest degradation should be avoided.94
(ii) Other Earth Summit Initiatives
The four other documents adopted by the nations participating in the
Earth Summit, while displaying an awareness of the various problems re-
lating to deforestation, were often lacking in their overall ability to ad-
vance the general cause of preventing it. The Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development, for example, only stated a number of
basic principles regarding sustainable development, such as that states
hold sovereign rights over their own resources, and that rates of develop-
ment should not exceed the renewal capacity of the earth nor prejudice
its future renewal capacity.95 The Climate Convention was equally
vague, recognizing the need to reduce carbon emissions without setting
90. See Klosek, supra note 17, at 145.
91. See Melanie Steiner, The Journey from Rio to Johannesburg. Ten Years of Forest
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out even the most basic framework for how to do so. 96
One document that is especially promising (although, as mentioned
above, so general as to make enforcement difficult) is Agenda 21, which
addresses the need to financially and legally support indigenous people in
their fight against both the social and environmental effects of deforesta-
tion.97 Implementation of the provisions in the document is very difficult
due to several factors: (1) the overall generality of the document; (2) the
sometimes-large disparities in the population of different groups of indig-
enous peoples means that some groups are much more likely to be fairly
represented than others; and (3) the ongoing conflict between the legally
established right of indigenous groups to exist in the state and govern-
ment organizations like the Indian Protection Agency, which purports to
support the rights of indigenous people but is often accused of trying to
facilitate the abandonment of the indigenous lifestyle. 98 Nevertheless,
Agenda 21 remains a significant document if for no other reason than its
recognition of the many indigenous people affected by deforestation, as
opposed to just a general recognition of the problem of deforestation
itself.
c. International Tropical Timber Agreement
Although the Earth Summit is widely viewed as successful in that it
brought many environmental issues to the forefront, it was unwilling to
step outside its ideological boundaries to recognize the interplay between
the protection of the environment and the protection of trade. Recogniz-
ing the often-unrealistic expectations that were a product of this unwill-
ingness to stray from idealistic values, the International Tropical Timber
Organization passed the latest version of the International Tropical Tim-
ber Agreement (ITTA), effective February 1995.99
Although the ITTA, at its essence, is concerned with promoting the
tropical timber industry, it is significant in that it does much more than
just make casual references to sustaining the environment. 100 Initially,
this is apparent from the preamble of the agreement, which incorporates
the entire body of documents produced by the Earth Summit, as well as
other international environmental agreement.1 01
The ITTA is a much more realistic document than other documents yet
the ITTA does have its share of problems. The underlying problem
preventing the ITTA from being more than minimally effective is that,
while the agreement does call for timber production more favorable to
the environment, it also repeatedly stresses state sovereignty. 10 2 This is
96. See id.
97. See Agenda 21, United Nations Conference on Environment and Development,
June 3, 1992 , available at http://www.un.org.
98. See Moran, supra note 14, at 405.
99. See Wilson, Jr., supra note 64, at 229-31.
100. See id.
101. Id. at 237-238.
102. See id. at 243-44.
BRAZILIAN AMAZON
viewed as a problem because, while there is a generally recognized excep-
tion to state sovereignty when activities in a particular state are shown to
have effects beyond that state's own borders, the deforestation of the
Brazilian Amazon or other rainforests affects other states in ways that are
often more difficult to quantify than other activities deemed hazardous to
the environment. 0 3 Thus, the ITTA's emphasis on state sovereignty
means that deforestation in a state, especially one as large as Brazil, is
likely to be left to that particular state to deal with unless the effects of
the deforestation are such that it is obvious to the global community that
action should be taken.
There is yet one more significant obstacle to the effectiveness of the
ITTA. As the first major trade agreement that specifically stresses the
importance of environmentally favorable policies and that actually incor-
porates a conservation component, the ITTA is considered by some to be
in significant conflict with much of the dominant trade agreements to
date, including the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).10 4
GATT is more typical of international trade agreements, stressing state
sovereignty and free trade while deemphasizing the importance of con-
servation.' 0 5 With its environmental emphasis, however, the ITTA is
viewed as having the potential to serve as somewhat of a blueprint for
future international trade agreements; or, at the very least, as having in-
serted the concerns about conservation and sustainable use into the inter-
national trade arena.' 0 6 Either way, it seems safe to expect the ITTA's
contribution to the fight against deforestation to come as much from fu-
ture international trade agreements as it does through provisions of the
ITTA itself.
d. World Summit on Sustainable Development
The World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD), more com-
monly known as the Johannesburg Summit, convened on August 26, 2002,
marking the ten-year anniversary of Rio and thirty years since Stock-
holm.10 7 The Johannesburg Summit is significant in that it was intended
from its earliest planning stages to be the first-ever multistakeholder sum-
mit, allowing for representation from not just the expected government
entities but also from industries and other entities with interests tied to
the forests.10 8 While it remains to be seen whether this multistakeholder
approach will prove helpful, it appears at the very least that those in
charge of the Johannesburg Summit emerged with a heightened sense of
urgency. "Johannesburg clearly put sustainable development back on the
agenda," said JoAnne DiSano, director of the UN's Division for Sustaina-
ble Development. "The Summit also sent a message to stop the chatter
103. See id. at 245.
104. See id. at 233.
105. See id.
106. Id.
107. Steiner, supra note 91, at 629.
108. See id. at 630.
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and get on with implementation."' 0 9
C. MEASURES TO PREVENT FURTHER DEFORESTATION:
DEBT-FOR-NATURE SWAPS
The prevention of deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon should re-
main a priority of the United States and the rest of the world, especially
when considering the overall impact deforestation can have on global sta-
bility. Considering the generally accepted notion that rampant poverty in
developing states is a pressing concern to international stability, it is not a
reach to believe that the continued degradation of the rainforest in states
like Brazil could further destabilize the already-shaky global commu-
nity.' 10 But this consideration is just one of many; more common con-
cerns such as the overall impact of deforestation on the environment and
maintaining the biodiversity of the Brazilian Amazon continue to be
pressing matters with which the world should concern itself. This section
will discuss a promising approach to curtailing deforestation in the Brazil-
ian Amazon, the debt-for-nature swap.
Because the root cause of deforestation of the Brazilian Amazon lies in
the country's huge debt, it follows that developing ways to decrease this
debt is crucial to effectively deal with the environmental crisis. One of
the most direct and innovative approaches thus far is the debt-for-nature
swap, which typically involves the purchase of Brazilian debt by a foreign
non-profit organization (or a foreign government acting in conjunction
with one) in return for the rights to a certain amount of land in the Brazil-
ian Amazon.' There are five main steps involved in a debt-for-nature
swap: (1) The organization seeks approval from the debtor nation (in this
case, Brazil); (2) the organization acquires the debt instrument; (3) it
transfers title to the debt; (4) the debt is converted into a local currency
instrument; and (5) the organization implements environmental invest-
ment programs.' 12
In May 1992 Brazil approved its first debt-for-nature swap. 1 13 The
purchase of $2.2 million of Brazilian debt was financed by the Nature
Conservancy, which raised $850,000 for the purchase and then donated
the debt to an organization called the Pro-Natureza Foundation
(FUNATURA); FUNATURA in turn exchanged the debt for $2.2 mil-
lion in long-term Brazilian "Environmental Government Bonds" paying
6 percent interest per year.1 14 The bonds were used to create an endow-
ment fund for the Grand Sertao Veredas National Park in Minas Gerais,
Brazil, with the interest being used to fund conservation, management,
109. Press Release, United Nations, UN Taking First Steps toward Implementing Jo-
hannesburg Outcome (Sept. 23, 2002), available at http://www.un.org.
110. See Wilson, Jr., supra note 64, at 246.
111. Reisman, supra note 1, at 405.
112. Id. at 406.
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and educational projects at the park." 15
Brazil's first debt-for-nature swap was especially promising considering
the other party involved in the swap, FUNATURA, seems committed to
addressing Brazil's many environmental problems. In recent years,
FUNATURA has teamed with the Brazilian Institute for Environment
and Natural Resources (IBAMA), a federal agency charged with protect-
ing Brazil's endangered resources, on several promising projects.116 In
addition to the project in Minas Gerais, the two organizations have estab-
lished wildlife sanctuaries throughout Brazil.t17 Other ongoing projects
include Sustainable Development in the Amazon Region; Non Wood
Tropical Forest Products: Processing, Trade and Collection; and Alterna-
tive Industrial Operations for Sustainable Production. 118 The work of
these groups is promising because, unlike many other attempts to curtail
deforestation, these have a known means to achieve their goals: the debt-
for-nature swap.
Debt-for-nature swaps continue to be an intriguing option for several
reasons, almost all of them relating to the fact that these agreements vir-
tually always involve a not-for-profit conservation organization on the
other end. For one, this situation means that a state like Brazil does not
have to worry about sovereignty concerns; the land involved is, after all,
technically going to a non-governmental, not-for-profit organization
(even though there is a good chance that the organization involved is
working closely with another government). 119 Another reason why debt-
for-nature swaps may become increasingly popular is the common per-
ception by the debtor country that it is in a favorable bargaining position,
considering the conservation organization on the other end of the swap
ostensibly has only one goal: to obtain and subsequently protect endan-
gered areas of land. 120 These reasons why debt-for-nature swaps may be-
come an increasingly attractive option to states like Brazil highlight the
underlying theme that makes these deals attractive: ideally they involve
benign non-governmental entities, as opposed to neighboring or distant
countries that may or may not enter the deal with motives as innocent as
conservation organizations.
Countering the attractiveness of a symbiotic, well-intentioned relation-
ship among parties involved in debt-for-nature swaps is the cold reality
that these deals often end up proving much less favorable than the debtor
country anticipates. In short, there is often a catch. When the United
States became involved in debt-for-nature swaps, through the Enterprise
for the Americas Initiative, it offered to allow debtor countries to pay the
115. Id. at 416-17.
116. Press Release, International Tropical Timber Organization, Institutional Profiles:
Pro-Natureza Foundation, available at http://itto.or.jp/newsletter/v7/n2/24institu
tional.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2002).
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interest of their debts (the principal still must be paid to the United
States) into special funds, which would support local environmental
projects.1 2 1 In return, though, the United States required the countries to
meet several fairly significant economic conditions, leading to a fair
amount of resentment toward U.S. policies and a renewed desire on the
part of the debtor countries to fall back on their old ways of using (or
more accurately, misusing) their own natural resources to pay down
debt. 122 This reality of debt-for-nature swaps presents countries looking
to enter such deals with a disturbing dilemma: they can opt for a big-
name partner in the swap, one supported by a country with deep pockets
but ulterior motives, or they can choose a more traditional, idealistic part-
ner, one who will attach fewer strings but be restrained financially.
Of course, the previous discussion assumes that a country like Brazil
would be interested in a debt-for-nature swap were the terms favorable.
This has not always been the case, though. 123 A former foreign minister
of Brazil, Abreu Sodre, was critical of these deals because they tend to
aim at halting development. 124
II. CONCLUSION
It is clear that if the world is serious about significantly curbing defor-
estation in the Brazilian Amazon, all parties must make a much greater
effort. The Brazilian government's immediate priorities should be two-
fold: (1) give local authorities more of an incentive to actually implement
the various environmentally friendly policies that have been touted; and
(2) place an increased focus on policies that emphasize a more direct ap-
proach to dealing with the environment, such as debt-for-nature swaps.
Although Brazil often supports land reform as a potential solution to
deforestation problems in Brazil, the problems (discussed above, in sec-
tion A(3)) with these programs can be formidable.1 25 In addition to the
problems discussed above regarding the actual implementation of these
programs, there have been dire consequences for people partaking in
them.126 In April 1996, Brazilian police killed nineteen settlers and
wounded forty more at the request of landowners on whose land the set-
tlers were living.127 Recorded by a television crew, the killings caused a
121. Id. at 45-46.
122. See id. at 46.
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ing the environment and not halting our industrial progress. What bothers us is
when industrialized countries try to impose their rules on us." Id.




national outrage and prompted government authorities to vow to speed
up the process of land reform. 128
Situations like this show why land reform is such a tantalizing, yet
problematic, solution to the problem of deforestation in the Brazilian
Amazon: The government rightfully sets out to have large amounts of
private, undeveloped land settled by landless people for sustainable use,
but then must respond when the no-doubt wealthy owners complain. It is
not surprising, then, that the settlers would rather just find a previously
unsettled part of the Brazilian Amazon. Nevertheless, land reform does
have a great deal of potential. If it was administered correctly, vast
amounts of land could be given to those who need it without further de-
forestation occurring.
As for worldwide efforts, the Johannesburg Summit should be consid-
ered promising because of its multi-stakeholder approach to dealing with
environmental problems. But the international community has touted
novel approaches before; what remains to be seen is how effective this
one will be. In the interim, an increased interest by countries like the
United States - specifically, by non-governmental organizations in the
United States - in debt-for-nature swaps would likely send a message that
halting deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon remains of utmost impor-
tance to the international community. But for any kind of significant pro-
gress to be made, the United States would be wise to limit the amount of
strings it attaches to these deals. It is likely that debt-for-nature swaps
will never be accorded real legitimacy until they appear to be, at least for
the most part, selfless acts reflecting true concern for the environment.
Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon is a tremendously complicated
problem. About the only thing regarding it that is undisputed is that it is
a problem of concern to the entire world, not just Brazil. As the world's
only remaining superpower, the United States should think very seriously
about bringing this issue to the forefront. It is likely that only when this
happens can the problem finally be effectively handled.
128. Id.
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